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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 11-3343 
______ 
 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION UNDERWRITERS OF AMERICA,  
A/S/O Park View at Waverly, A Condominium C/O/ PMI Management 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RHODES DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INC., et.al. 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (District Court No. 1-09-cv-00257) 
District Court Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GARTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 12, 2012) 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
On December 1, 2005, Waverly Woods Associates (“Waverly Woods”) entered 
into a construction contract with defendant Rhodes Development Group (“Rhodes”).  
Rhodes agreed to serve as the general contractor to build a number of townhouse 
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condominiums on Waverly Woods’ land.  The construction contract included a clause 
entitled “Waivers of Subrogation,” which provided in relevant part that: 
The Owner [Waverly Woods] and Contractor [Rhodes] waive all rights 
against . . . each other and any of their subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, 
agents and employees, each of the other . . . for damages caused by fire or 
other perils to the extent covered by property insurance applicable to the 
Work . . . .        
  
After the construction contract was executed, Rhodes subcontracted with a number of 
other entities, including defendant Adams Drywall, who agreed to install the 
condominiums’ drywall.  Adams Drywall entered into an oral subcontract with defendant 
Pedro Quintero (“Quintero”) to perform the labor for the drywall installation.  
 On May 24, 2007, Waverly Woods created a condominium association called 
“Park View at Waverly” (“Park View”), and transferred the condominiums and land to 
Park View.  Park View thereafter obtained an insurance policy issued by the plaintiff, 
Community Association Underwriters of America (“CAUA”), to cover the condominium 
units. 
 On March 4, 2008, a fire at Park View damaged several condominiums.  Park 
View submitted a claim for damages to CAUA, which paid the claim.  CAUA 
subsequently sought to recover the insurance payments from the parties it claimed were 
responsible for the fire.  CAUA filed a complaint asserting claims for both negligence 
and breach of contract against Rhodes, Adams Drywall, and Quintero.  In its complaint, 
CAUA alleged that the fire was caused by the negligent placement and handling of 
propane heaters used during the installation of the drywall.  CAUA also claimed that this 
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negligence “breached the express and implied terms of the contract[s]” between Waverly 
Woods and Rhodes, as well as between Rhodes and the subcontractors.           
On March 25, 2011, CAUA sought to amend its complaint to remove the breach of 
contract claims and deleted from the Amended Complaint all allegations that Park View 
was a third-party beneficiary to the contracts.  On April 13, 2011, the District Court 
granted the motion to amend.  Thereafter, CAUA’s complaint alleged one cause of action 
against Rhodes for negligence and one cause of action against Adams Drywall and 
Quintero for negligence.  In their answers, the defendants crossclaimed against one 
another. 
On April 27, 2011, following CAUA’s amendment of its complaint, the 
defendants filed amended motions for summary judgment based upon the waiver of 
subrogation, arguing that Park View was an intended third-party beneficiary of the 
construction contract.  The District Court ultimately granted summary judgment, 
concluding that Park View and CAUA were intended third party beneficiaries of the 
contract, and were therefore bound by the waiver of subrogation clause.  CAUA 
appealed.  No mention appeared in the District Court’s opinion as to the negligence 
counts in the Amended Complaint. 
I. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and this Court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence in favor of the non-moving 
party and resolving all doubts in that party’s favor.  S.E.C. v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 
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F.3d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 1997).  Summary judgment should not be granted if the non-
moving party produces evidence that “could be the basis for a jury finding in that party’s 
favor.”  Kline v. First Western Gov’t Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 1994).  Similarly, 
summary judgment should not be granted unless “legal theory or doctrine supports the 
movant’s position that judgment should be entered.”  10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2725. 
II. 
 On appeal, the parties dedicated the whole of their briefs to the applicability of the 
waiver of subrogation clause—CAUA argues that it is not an intended third party 
beneficiary,
1
 and thus is not subject to the waiver clause.  Rhodes, Adams Drywall, and 
Quintero argue the reverse.   
It is established law in this Circuit that “a third party beneficiary will only be 
bound by the terms of the underlying contract where the claims asserted by that 
beneficiary arise from its third party beneficiary status.”  E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 2001).  
As a consequence, the waiver of subrogation clause only applies to CAUA (a non-party 
to the contract) to the extent that it asserts claims arising under that contract.   
 Our review of CAUA’s Amended Complaint reveals that it is no longer making 
any contract claims—to the contrary, both counts alleged in its Amended Complaint are 
styled as counts of negligence, and both counts sound exclusively in the tort law of 
                                              
1
 In its original complaint, CAUA asserted that it was an intended third party beneficiary 
to the contract between Rhodes and Waverly Woods. 
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negligence.
2
  We are therefore compelled to conclude that CAUA’s status as an intended 
third party beneficiary of the original contract is not relevant to the disposition of the 
present matter.  The waiver of subrogation did not waive CAUA’s claims of negligence, 
and it is only claims of negligence which CAUA has alleged. 
III. 
 In disposing of this matter on the basis of the waiver of subrogation, the District 
Court declined to consider the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on 
spoliation of evidence or a deficient expert report,
3
 both of which pertain to negligence 
causes of action which have no relevance to the claims of contract argued by the parties.   
Inasmuch as it was error to grant summary judgment on the basis of the waiver of 
subrogation, the District Court must now consider those motions before proceeding to the 
merits of CAUA’s claims of negligence, and, if necessary, the defendants’ crossclaims.  
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order of July 29, 2011 and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
4
 
                                              
2
 Count 1 seeks recovery from Rhodes for monies which CAUA paid to Waverly;  
Count 2 seeks recovery from Adams Drywall and Quintero for the same monies. 
 
3
 In footnote 2 of its opinion, the District Court stated that “[t]he parties submitted 
numerous additional facts in connection with Defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment based on spoliation and a deficient expert report, including a time line detailing 
the alleged events on the days following the March 4, 2008 fire.  Many of these facts, 
however, are not relevant to Defendants’ waiver of subrogation argument.  For clarity of 
the record, the court will only recite facts related to Defendants’ waiver argument.”  See 
CAUA v. Rhodes, et.al., No. 1:09-CV-0257, (M.D.Pa. July 29, 2011), n.2. 
 
4
 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 30, “Appendix to the Briefs” requires that “. . . the 
relevant portions of the pleadings . . .” must be included in the appendix.  Neither the 
original complaint nor the Amended Complaint, which is essential to the resolution of 
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this appeal, was included in the appendix.  It is unacceptable that counsel is not familiar 
with and did not comply with the basic rules of appellate procedure. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring 
It is unclear to me whether the third party beneficiary question should be the basis 
for the District Court’s dismissal of the case.  Clearly, the Majority believes that it should 
not.  We need not resolve this issue, however, because I agree with the Majority that 
CAUA’s claims for negligence should proceed.  Whether or not the third party 
beneficiary question controls, the result is the same:  the dismissal was not appropriate.  I 
write separately to explain why this is so if the third party beneficiary principles do apply. 
Pennsylvania has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts test for 
determining whether a party is an intended third party beneficiary.  See Guy v. 
Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 751 (Pa. 1983).  According to that test, a party is an intended 
third party beneficiary when “recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is 
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties” and, in relevant part, the 
circumstances “indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of 
the promised performance.”  Rest. (2d) of Contracts § 302(a).  If the parties’ intent to 
benefit a third party is not express in the contract, there must be “circumstances that are 
so compelling” before we recognize a third party beneficiary as an intended one.  
Scarpitti v. Weborg, 609 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1992).   
There is insufficient evidence, in the terms of the contract and in the circumstances 
surrounding its making, demonstrating that Waverly Woods and Rhodes intended to 
benefit Park View.  The only evidence in the contract itself that might suggest an intent to 
benefit Park View is Article 2, captioned “The Work of this Contract.”  Article 2 
describes the scope of work of the contract as “Construction of ninety-one (91) 
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townhouse condominium units including all related site work for the project known as 
Parkview @ Waverly – Phase 7.”  (App. 65a.)  The District Court reasoned that, because 
the parties were building condominiums, they therefore intended that a condominium 
association be formed.  Accordingly, the parties must have intended to benefit Park View. 
While the District Court’s inferences in this regard are logical, they are not evidence of 
intent.  Instead, we must look to the terms of the contract and the circumstances 
surrounding its making to determine whether the parties evidence an intent to benefit a 
third party.   
In Lake Placid Club Attached Lodges v. Elizabethtown Builders, Inc., 521 
N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), the plaintiff, an unincorporated joint venture 
comprised of owners of residential condominium units, sued the builder of the 
condominium for breach of the contract between the developer and the builder.  Applying 
the test set forth in § 302 of the Restatement, the court held that the joint venture was not 
an intended beneficiary of the contract between the developer and builder because there 
was no evidence from the “contractual language or other circumstances manifesting a 
mutual intent of the contracting parties to confer rights to performance on the ultimate 
owners of the units.”  Id.  The court continued, “indeed, there is nothing whatsoever in 
the record to suggest that the developer had in mind anything but the normal business 
motive to obtain a construction project of sufficient quality for ready marketability of the 
condominium units to potential customers.”  Id.  I believe that the same is true here. 
Indeed, the contract actually evidences an intent not to benefit Park View.  The 
contract states that “The Contract Documents shall not be construed to create a 
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contractual relationship of any kind (1) between the Architect and Contractor, (2) 
between the Owner and a Subcontractor or Sub-subcontractor or (3) between any persons 
or entities other than the Owner and Contractor.”  (App. 78a.)  The District Court rejected 
CAUA’s argument regarding this provision based on Vaughn, Coltrane & Associates v. 
Van Horn Construction, Inc., 563 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. App. 2002), which held that, 
notwithstanding a similar provision disclaiming the creation of any contractual 
relationships, the contracting parties may still intend to benefit a third party.  Vaughn is 
distinguishable, however, because there, the consultants seeking third party beneficiary 
recognition relied on language elsewhere in the contract which explicitly provided a right 
of indemnification to the consultants.  See id. at 550.  Here, there is no other language in 
the contract upon which the Park View could rely to claim third party beneficiary status. 
More importantly, we have held that a “no contractual relationship” clause is 
evidence of the contracting parties’ intent not to create any third party beneficiaries.  In 
Pierce Associates, Inc. v. Nemours Foundation, 865 F.2d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 1988), we 
reasoned that a nearly-identical disclaimer “is a strong indication of an intent” not to 
benefit a third party.  In holding that the plaintiff was not an intended third party 
beneficiary of the subcontract, we emphasized that in construction contracts, “the owner 
is the one who ultimately benefits from its performance.  However, this does not create a 
third party beneficiary relationship.”  Id.; see also Dick Anderson Constr., Inc. v. Monroe 
Constr. Co., 221 P.3d 675, 686 (Mont. 2009) (viewing a similar disclaimer as 
“preclud[ing] anyone . . . from claiming third-party beneficiary status under the 
contract.”); Yaffe v. Scarlett Place Residential Condo., Inc., -- A.3d -- , 2012 WL 
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1998066 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (viewing “no contractual relationship” disclaimer as 
evidence that contracting parties did not intend to confer third party beneficiary status on 
condominium unit owner who sought to enforce contract between condominium 
developer and contractor). 
Moreover, the District Court erred in considering the Declaration of Condominium 
filed by Waverly Woods pursuant to 68 Pa. C.S. § 3201 as evidence of the parties’ intent 
to benefit Park View.  Whether parties intend to benefit a third person must be “within 
the contemplation of the promisor and the promisee at the time of contracting.”  
Scarpitti, 609 A.2d at 151 (emphasis added).  The Declaration of Condominium was 
executed over a year after Rhodes and Waverly Woods entered into the contract, and is 
evidence only of Waverly Woods’ intent.   
In sum, the lack of evidence showing an intent to benefit Park View, coupled with 
the “no contractual relationship” disclaimer, compels our conclusion that Park View is 
not an intended third party beneficiary to the contract.  Therefore, the waiver of 
subrogation does not apply to CAUA’s claims.  Accordingly, I agree that we should 
vacate the judgment of the District Court. 
